The status and use of soft law in local governments’ management of urban development by Asakawa, Kenji
The 18th International Planning History Society Conference - Yokohama, July 2018 
 
The status and use of soft law in local governments’ management of urban 
development: Restructuring the logical framework of administrative guidance on 
impact fees for housing development in 1970s Japan 
Kenji Asakawa 
JD, Institute for Global Environmental Strategies (IGES), asakawa@iges.or.jp  
 
This research aims to analyse the use of administrative guidance such as the local development exaction 
system for collecting impact fees from developers in connection with housing developments from the 
viewpoint of “soft law”, as a collection of nonbinding social norms in Japan. It takes a brief look at the 
history of Japanese administrative guidance on impact fees from 1960s to 1990s, to identify how it 
contributed to public infrastructure development as a form of soft law in Yokohama. Furthermore, it 
considers the situation now faced by rapidly growing cities in developing countries and what they may 
learn facing a similar dilemma to that which confronted Japanese local governments in the past. Finally, 
it recommends more effective soft law for the management of urban development by cities in developing 
countries, and identifies challenges, some of which Yokohama experienced and others which it did not, 
which are likely to arise in developing countries wishing to make use of soft law such as local 
development exaction systems.   
Keywords: soft law, local governments in Japan, urban development management, administrative 
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Research objectives and introduction: Why local governments needed administrative 
guidance on impact fees for housing developments yet refrained from using them  
This research aims to analyse the rationale behind Japanese local government use and abolition of administrative 
guidance such as the local development exaction system for collecting impact fees from developers in connection 
with housing developments in 1960s and 1970s then consider whether similar guidance could be used to address 
public infrastructure development issues in major cities of developing countries, using Japan’s experience in the 
1960s and1970s as a precedent. Insofar as an analogy may be drawn, this research intends to consider how such 
guidance could work more effectively than it did in Yokohama, which remains one of the model cases of 
implementing such guidance successfully from the viewpoint of “soft law”, as a collection of nonbinding social 
norms. 
The rapid housing development that accompanied Japan’s high economic growth starting in the 1960s primarily 
advanced in areas adjacent to major cities. This forced local governments, which were legally responsible for the 
construction and maintenance of public infrastructure, to incur significant expenses investing in such infrastructure. 
This included space-intensive projects, such as public schools for compulsory education consisting of elementary 
and junior high schools, and urban parks, which are required to be built both in proportion to the number of school 
children by the School Education Act, and the dimensions of the housing development in new housing areas, 
respectively. However, local governments’ budgets could not accommodate the sharp increase of expenditure that 
accompanied such rapid population growth and housing development, since their additional revenue, especially 
that levied as local inhabitant tax from new residents, would not become available until the housing development 
for those new residents had been completed and those residents had moved in. In addition, although local 
governments sought a land value capture method to fund investment in public infrastructure, land readjustment 
could only provide rather small-scale spaces such as for roads, but was not sufficiently robust to secure space for 
large-scale infrastructure of the type mentioned above. Miki1 analysed that the “benefit principle” system under 
Urban Planning Act could be utilised only for building sewerage because it was difficult to place a concrete value 
on the benefits realised from other public infrastructure.  In order to levy additional local taxation, local 
governments are legally required to obtain permission from central government for tax not stipulated in the Local 
Autonomy Act. Furthermore, local governments were required to permit urban development according to the laws 
imposed by the central government, and Usui2 said that they did not have any discretion to take the local situation 
into consideration when granting development permission. Therefore, many local governments established so-
called “administrative guidance” including a local development exaction system (hereinafter called the “LDE 
system”) to require contributions of land in connection with housing developments, which relieved a significant 
portion of the financial burden on local governments that would otherwise be caused by these developments. 
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LDE systems typically stipulated the scope of their applicability and standards setting out the required dimensions 
of land to be provided for public infrastructure, as in Yokohama (see Table 1). Although it did not have legally 
binding force on developers, most local governments were able to obtain developers’ voluntary compliance and 
have them contribute a portion of their developed land for free or at a nominal3 price. Developers’ willingness to 
contribute should be seen against the prevailing economic circumstances in which a rapid increase in land prices 
meant developers could afford to comply, and their early compliance could facilitate cooperation of local 
governments, especially in the 12 major cities entitled to permit urban development in the early 1970s.  
 
Applicability All housing development projects* 
Land required to be 
contributed for parks 
Equal to or greater than 4% (for a public developer) or 3% (for a private developer) 
of development area without compensation 
Land required to be 
contributed for public 
schools for compulsory 
education 
Equal or more than 5% of development area with compensation for their costs, 
excluding their loss of income 
*: From 1972, this was applicable to housing developments with an area equal to or greater than 0.1 ha. 
 
Table 1: The administrative guidance of Yokohama concerning its LDE system in relation to housing development 
(excerpt). Chosa Kiho (Quarterly Journal of Policy Studies) (in Japanese). [City of Yokohama, 1968] 75-78. 
 
The city of Yokohama was the first major city to establish such administrative guidance since it had been rapidly 
populated by a large number of commuters to Tokyo, which imposed a severe financial burden for public 
infrastructure development. As a result, about 60% of land used for public  schools for compulsory education, 
equal to land for 150 schools, was procured and 1.9 times the statutory minimum size of park land was secured 
from developers during the 25 years up to 1995 as calculated by Toshihiro and Sato4 and Taguchi5 As Yokohama’s 
success was observed by other local governments, approximately 99% of local governments in Tokyo, 70% of 
local governments in Japan’s three largest urban areas and 46% of all local governments nationwide had 
established similar guidance by 1996. (see Figure 1) 
 
Figure 1: Share of local governments establishing administrative guidance on impact fees for housing 
developments and population growth. National census. [Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications, 1995], 
Takuchi Kaihatsu Yoko no Minaoshi no Pointo (How to revise administrative guidance on impact fees for housing 
development) (in Japanese). [Ministry of Construction, 1997], 8. 
 
However, the lack of binding force behind these guidelines also caused tension between local governments’ 
demands and non-compliant developers. Furthermore, some non-compliant developers brought lawsuits against 
the local governments to confirm the lack of binding force of the guidance and/or claiming compensation. A few 
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small and mid-sized local governments lost such cases, as in Yamaki Kensetsu Kabushiki Kaisha v. the City of 
Musashino, [Tokyo Dist. Ct. 1975], since they could not control permits for urban development and abused their 
discretion to refuse non-compliant developers’ requests for access to water supply and/or sewerage infrastructure. 
Those cases due to local governments’ abuse of their discretion using administrative guidance became a source of 
social criticism and were blamed for raising land prices, and the Ministry of Construction issued 11 official 
circulars notes from 1982 to 1996 requesting that local governments refrain from imposing their LDE systems on 
developers. In addition, public demand for housing developments had been moderated by the slow-down in 
economic growth from the late 1970s, shifting the focus of local governments from “restraining” to “inducing” 
housing development in order to generate needed revenue from local tax by increasing their local populations. 
Accordingly, the majority of local governments refrained from implementing such guidelines, perceiving them 
negatively as stopgap measures to an issue that required the enactment of alternative laws and regulations at a 
national level, as evaluated by Ministry of Construction6. 
Re-evaluating administrative guidance by restructuring the logical framework as soft law: 
How the city of Yokohama implemented it successfully 
Even without legal binding force, administrative guidance (soft law) in Japan is considered a social norm in the 
same manner as laws and regulations (hard law) are, in terms of their common intent to serve the public welfare. 
The defining characteristic of soft law is a tool to lead people in a specific direction intended by the social norm 
maker. Therefore hard law is unnecessary where soft law can successfully elicit voluntary cooperation between 
parties. Moreover, soft law is somewhat superior to hard law in terms of its ability to build solid consensus without 
binding force, and its flexibility in establishing procedures to address various cases and accommodate changes in 
the market involving parties. Because of the abovementioned advantages, local governments were able to use 
administrative guidance to contribute to urban development control through the soft law of the LDE system. 
Therefore, administrative guidance should be perceived more positively as an effective policy tool.  
From the viewpoint of law and economics, a party’s obedience of a social norm is understood as based on 
maximising its own interests, and whether those interests will best be served by compliance with or non-
compliance with that norm, considering the benefits and consequences of each option, as explained by Tyler7.  
Regarding the factors considered when one assesses whether to comply with a social norm, Iida8 identified 
sanctions, the necessity of the norm in question and individual morality as major factors that affect parties’ 
decisions regarding the above, and sanctions are one of the most significant factors affecting parties’ decision 
making. Sanctions can be categorised into two types: (1) those imposed by an authority, such as penalties, and 
which may be accompanied by hard law, and (2) those imposed by society, such as damage to reputation, which 
may be accompanied by soft law as well as hard law. In terms of this classification, administrative guidance may 
be regarded as soft law accompanied by sanctions imposed by society, such as the reputational effect9.  
Yokohama’s administrative guidance applied to developers can be considered a model case of an LDE system in 
terms of eliciting voluntary compliance, which is considered one of the most critical challenges for utilising 
administrative guidance as soft law. The following discussion addresses why Yokohama was successful. 
As mentioned above, it is important to increase the impact on a party’s interests in complying with the norm, 
including the detriment caused by violation, to lend credibility to soft law. According to Fujita and Matsumura10, 
the interests consist of the following three types: (1) direct and subjective benefits from compliance shared only 
between the local government and the developers, (2) long-term benefits (if prioritised by the developer), and (3) 
indirect benefits that may be accrued by demonstrating their compliance with the guidance. 
Regarding (1) subjective benefits, since most developers in Yokohama are private companies, they will comply 
with guidance where compliance aligns with their economic interests. The economic interests of developers were 
served by the following in the case of Yokohama. Land in Yokohama had a higher scarcity value for housing 
development since as Tamura11 said the Yokohama administration allowed a comparatively smaller area for 
development, approximately only 75% of the whole administrative area, compared to the area in Kawasaki, which 
is an adjacent city to Yokohama and has topographical characteristics similar to Yokohama, which opened 
approximately 88%. This enhanced the attractiveness of Yokohama, especially to commuters who continued to 
work in Tokyo, and created a strong incentive for developers to build housing in Yokohama. Furthermore, since 
the city of Yokohama was vested with the authority to issue land development permits as one of the government-
designated major cities, that fact encouraged developers to comply with the guidance as early as possible in order 
to swiftly obtain land development permission. In addition, the guidance strengthened the bargaining power of the 
city of Yokohama by integrating the departments in charge of public infrastructure that normally negotiated 
individually with developers, since the guidance concerned various sections of public infrastructure, which helped 
the Planning and Coordination Bureau work as a central authority under the strong leadership of Dr Akira Tamura. 
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Therefore, the city of Yokohama offered (1) subjective benefits to developers to facilitate voluntary compliance 
with their guidance as a result. 
The (2) priority given to long-term benefits applies to developers who prioritise long-term benefit over short-term 
gain, and attracts developers seeking long-term benefits through their compliance with norms. Fujita and 
Matsumura12 identified the factors that affect the impact of (2) on a party’s interests, such as the size of the group 
or party affected by the norm, as well as its type and degree of homogeneity. In the case of Yokohama, since 
housing development to be subject to the administrative guidance is predominantly promoted by railway company 
seeking transit-oriented development which could provide long-term benefits more than the other kind of housing 
development, the number of major developers prioritising long-term benefits was relatively few, and this factor 
increased the homogeneity of developers. The public, especially potential buyers of housing real estate, could 
easily identify each developer individually and this enhanced (3) the reputation effect, discussed below. This meant 
that developers tended to follow the leading developer, Tokyu Corporation, which fully complied with the 
administrative guidance since it had been derived from agreement between Tokyu Corporation and the city of 
Yokohama. Therefore, although the city of Yokohama might have utilised the homogeneity of developers in order 
to facilitate their voluntary compliance with the norms that the leading developer had already accepted, the feature 
of homogeneity among parties is not one within the control of a local government, and the city of Yokohama had 
no power to increase a developers’ preference for (2). 
Regarding (3) indirect benefits that may be attracted by developers demonstrating their compliance with the 
guidance, Fujita and Matsumura13 explained (3) indirect benefits can be accessed by information about a vendor 
which can be conveyed only indirectly by demonstrating the differences between vendors to consumers. In the 
case of administrative guidance, a developer’s compliance would indicate that the accompanying public 
infrastructure has been properly built, and accordingly, the quality of the residential land is guaranteed to an extent, 
indicating that land meeting the specifications of administrative guidance may be of a higher standard, or that a 
compliant developer may be expected to develop land for comfortable living. The local government could signal 
the above to the general public, and the developer would therefore realise value through such compliance by 
gaining a greater profit from higher sales of their residential land. In addition, as the guidance set specifications 
on more essential public infrastructure for living, non-compliance with those specifications would cause larger 
loss due to reputational effects. Although the city of Yokohama at one stage intended to place a notice in a 
newspaper indicating that an area developed by Tokyu Corporation would not have an elementary school if Tokyu 
Corporation refused to obey their guidance as Tamura reminisced,14 they did not take measures to credit compliant 
developers. Local government might be able to further enhance developers’ compliance with administrative 
guidance if they demonstrated a positive endorsement for compliant developers, such as an accreditation system 
for housing land meeting the specifications of their guidance. 
 
Applicability to growing cities in developing countries: Implications of LDE systems 
Local governments are responsible for providing various kinds of public services. Although the types of services 
supplied by local governments varies, local governments in Indonesia and Vietnam are responsible for the same 
kinds of services as those in Japan (see table 1). However, only small budgets are allocated for the services in local 
governments, for example, local governments in Indonesia spend less than 1/60th of the average expenditure in 
Japan (see table 2). Considering the decentralisation of authority in developing countries tends to assign local 
governments to deliver public services at their cost without taxation allocated from central government, many local 
governments in developing countries cannot afford to supply sufficient public services for rapidly developed 
housing areas at their own expense, though grants from central government to local governments partly fill the 
gap, as analysed by Kimura15. 
Country Planning Basic 
education 
Basic 
social 
welfare 
Basic 
health 
service 
Water 
supply 
Electricity 
supply 
Public 
transport 
Business 
development 
support 
Japan Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes 
China Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes 
India Yes Yes No Yes Yes No Yes Yes 
Indonesia Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes 
Malaysia Yes No No No Yes No Yes Yes 
Philippines Yes No Yes Yes Yes No No Yes 
Thailand Yes Yes Yes No Yes No Yes Yes 
Vietnam Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes 
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Table 1 Service delivered by local governments in the Asia-Pacific region, Decentralization and Local 
Democracy in the World: First Global Report by United Cities and Local Governments 2008. World Bank 
Publications. (Cities, U., & Governments, L. 2008) 67. 
 
Country Total public 
expenditure 
 
a) as % of GDP 
b) € per capita 
Local public 
expenditure 
(local and meso 
level only) 
 
a) % of GDP 
b) € per capita 
Ratio of local 
public 
expenses/total 
public expenses 
Tax shares + 
general grants 
as % of the total 
LM income 
Local tax 
revenues (=tax 
revenues subject 
to a local tax 
power) as % of 
total LM income 
Japan a) 22.9% 
b) 7,243 
a) 12.3% 
b) 3,903 
53.6% 69% 34% 
Indonesia a) 19% 
b) 189 
a) 6% 
b) 62 
33% 70% <10% 
Vietnam a) 24% 
b) n/a 
a) 11% 
b) n/a 
48% 44% 24% 
Table 2 Relative size of local governments’ expenditure and income in the Asia-Pacific region, Decentralization 
and Local Democracy in the World: First Global Report by United Cities and Local Governments 2008. World 
Bank Publications. (Cities, U., & Governments, L. 2008) 68. 
 
Furthermore, it is unrealistic for local governments in developing countries to establish additional local tax 
independently from central government. In Indonesia and the Philippines, since the variety of the local tax is 
limited/controlled by national law, they do not have any discretion to establish additional types of local tax. In 
those circumstances, they cannot increase revenue from the current taxation settings. Therefore, in order to raise 
revenue they would be greatly assisted by a voluntary LDE system based on soft law, such as the administrative 
guidance adopted in Japan. 
Since soft law can bring certain incentives for land developers even in developing countries, and economic 
incentives are of major benefit to developers, developing countries may wish to consider the feasibility and 
effectiveness of a similar LDE system to that implemented by the Yokohama administration, by considering the 
incentives of (1), (2) and (3) above. Local governments in developing countries could increase the benefits offered 
to developers under (1), especially those which are vested with the right to issue land development permits as in 
Yokohama. However, a major part of housing land in developing countries’ major cities tends to be developed by 
foreign developers who decrease the homogeneity of developers and could reduce (2) as a result. However, local 
governments could learn from Yokohama’s experience by making greater use of the reputational benefits such as 
those in (3) if they successfully launched a labelling and/or certification system that recognised compliant 
developers. 
 
The way forward: Concluding remarks 
Rapidly growing cities in developing countries face a similar dilemma to that experienced by Japanese local 
governments in the past, and they may likewise be expected to have difficulties in raising capital for public 
infrastructure investment. This research has considered key taxation and public spending settings in a small number 
of developing countries for the purpose of exploring whether Japanese local government use of soft law could act 
as a kind of model. Nevertheless, successful application of soft law in developing countries will require further 
analysis of enabling environment of those countries for such a soft law, including their differences from Japan, in 
order to ensure that the implementation of LDE systems can be successful. Subject to that additional analysis, soft 
law of LDE systems may be a more appropriate solution than legislation, especially in developing countries where 
the rule of law is weak, since they have greater difficulty developing and enforcing laws when compared to 
Japanese local governments that have experienced high economic growth. Therefore lessons learned from Japanese 
local governments, especially the Japanese experience of using soft law for urban development management, 
including how to achieve such a solid consensus without the availability of legal coercion, could contribute to 
more effective practice of using impact fees to solve this dilemma in developing countries. 
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However, local governments in developing countries making use of soft law such as LDE systems would face the 
other challenges outlined below, some of which Yokohama experienced and others which it did not, but are likely 
to arise in developing countries.  
As Uga16 identified, Japan’s experience was that administrative guidance incentivised17 developers to scale down 
the size of their land developments in order to avoid requirements of the guidance that specified minimum sizes in 
determining its scope of applicability including in Yokohama. Since those local governments never found a 
satisfactory solution to that issue, it remains one of the big challenges accompanying the use of administrative 
guidance. In addition, there are the other issues that are faced commonly by local governments in developing 
countries, such as the governance and institutional capacity of the local governments. 
Regarding governance capacity, local governments’ direct collection of impact fees from developers would 
engender a risk of bureaucratic corruption, such as bribery. All taxes, including local taxes, are generally collected 
by central government, and this provides a safeguard against corruption in local governments that tend to have 
lower capacity in terms of governance than central government. 
Regarding institutional capacity, the city of Yokohama invited professionals to organise the Planning and 
Coordination Bureau as a central authority for implementing administrative guidance, including Dr Akira Tamura, 
head of the Bureau, who was directly invited by the Yokohama city mayor of that time, Ichio Asukata. In addition 
to having their bargaining power boosted by the guidance and institutional reform to establish the Bureau, 
competent professionals working as tough negotiators brought continued success to their application of their 
guidance. Since local governments in developing counties still face many issues due to their varying individual 
capacities, successful application of such guidance would seem more challenging in developing countries.   
Soft law can contribute to fundraising for public infrastructure, just as the LDE system did in many Japanese local 
governments, including Yokohama. As discussed above, it has certain advantages and should be considered as an 
alternative to legislation from central government. If local governments in developing countries are able to 
strengthen their capacity sufficiently to implement such administrative guidance, they can learn from the 
experience in Japan generally, and especially the model provided by Yokohama. 
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